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THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE
HARRY W. JONES*
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lectureship was established in the School of
Law of Washington University by alumni of the school in 1949, to honor the mem-
ory of a well-loved alumnus and faculty member whose connection with and service
to the school extended over the period 1898-1947. This eighteenth annual lecture
was delivered March 9, 1966.
Thirty-five years ago, I studied Contracts at the feet of the great teacher
whose memory honors this series of annual lectures. I could not now recite
a single rule I learned from Tyrrell Williams or state the facts of any case
we covered in his course. What I retain from Professor Williams' teaching
is something incomparably more important, his insistence that the admin-
istration of law is not a closed system but a social process and that legal
reasoning requires not only powers of abstraction and logical inference but
also continuing acts of imaginative perception and ethical judgment. Best
of all I remember a morning in the fall of 1931 when I began to put away
childish things and understand what law in life is all about.
Professor Williams began his Contracts class that day by expounding one
of his wonderful hypothetical cases and inviting volunteers. Angels would
have feared to tread there, but I rushed in with a confident and categorical
answer. Professor Williams looked over his glasses quizzically, shook his
head to brush me off, and called on someone else. Strong in the valor of
ignorance I took up the argument with him after class. To be sure, his
analysis of the problem case had made it plain that the result for which I
was contending would be unfair as between the parties to the supposed con-
troversy. But what of that? I was relying on an impeccable general prop-
osition of law, and the syllogism in which my argument moved from major
premise to conclusion was steady and remorseless, or so it seemed to me.
"And so, sir," I concluded, "isn't that the way your case would have to go?"
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University.
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Tyrrell Williams was kind, but his vast kindness was tempered with in-
tellectual toughness as every great teacher's must be. "You are losing sight
of the merits of the case," he said. "That decision would be terribly unjust
on the facts I gave you. You know-or ought to by now-that no decent
judge would reach that result in my case."
"But, sir," I persisted, "that is how he would have to decide it, whether
he wanted to or not."
"Have to, my eye!" replied my master. "It isn't very often that a judge
has to decide a case unjustly. He'd find a way to decide it right-and so
would you if you could get it through your head this is a case, not an exer-
cise in algebra."
This was the greatest of the countless lessons I learned from Tyrrell Wil-
liams during the three years I was his student and the three additional
years, here at Washington University, when I was his colleague on the law
faculty but his student still. It is appropriate, I think, that I make this cru-
cial lesson the subject of our 1966 Tyrrell Williams Lecture. Individual
case "merits" are fully as influential as general legal rules as factors in how
cases actually get decided. It is only rarely in our legal order that the just-
ness of a claim is not the strongest argument that can be made in support
of its recognition. Jurisprudential theory is remote from the reality of law
in action unless it takes full and sufficient account of this element of in-
dividual justice in the administration of law. The practicing lawyer who
ignores this fact of legal life does so at his peril.
I. THE BINOCULAR VISION OF JUSTICE
"A case, not an exercise in algebra!" Professor Williams' crisp reminder
of the primacy of the case for the practice of justice came back to me many
years later at a university seminar on the professions, when I heard a great
internist' describe the practice of his profession. There are, he said, two
equally important elements in medical practice, the science of medicine
and the art of healing. The art without the science is at best benevolent
quackery, the science without the art cold and limited in therapeutic effec-
tiveness. The great physician is master of them both, learned in the science
of his profession and, at the same time, possessed of a sympathetic vision
that sees the patient before him not just as a more or less standard example
1. Dr. Dana W. Atchley, Professor Emeritus of Clinical Medicine, College of Physi-
cians and Surgeons, Columbia University. The University Seminar on the Professions,
which met at Columbia from 1950 to 1953 under the chairmanship of the distinguished
sociologist, Robert K. Merton, was supported by a grant from the Russell Sage
Foundation. The Seminar was composed of members representing eight professions:
medicine, law, architecture, engineering, social work, the ministry, nursing, and education.
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of encephalitis or Parkinsonism but as a unique and complex individual,
a whole man of personal dignity and inalienable singularity.
Similarly, I suggest, there are two equally important elements in the ad-
ministration of justice, the science of law-for legal precepts and legal rea-
soning have at least some of the attributes of a science-and what I will
call the art of the lawyer. Every case that comes to a court for decision-
or to a lawyer's office for counseling or advocacy-is, on the scientific view
of things, an item for conceptual analysis and classification. Doe v. Roe is,
we say, an equal protection case or a third party beneficiary case or a con-
structive trust case, and this classification brings the applicable rules and
precedents into play for analysis, argument, and judicial explanation. But
Doe v. Roe is more than a specimen for classification; it has its further
reality as a concrete dispute between living claimants and calls for a fair and
just disposition between them.
Which is the ultimate reality, the general rule or the concrete case? To
ask this is to enter a battleground over which philosophers have fought for
many centuries. Are we to associate ourselves with the philosophical "real-
ists" and so locate ultimate legal reality in the area of the universal, the
general legal proposition or concept? Or are we to join forces with the
philosophical "nominalists" and assert that only concrete cases are real and
general legal concepts but names devised for convenient groupings of sin-
gular reality? In law, no such hard choice is forced on us. Realism and
nominalism are two ways of seeing, and our adjudicative tradition makes
use of them both.
Consider, as our analogy, the following passage from Ernst Cassirer's
Essay on Man:
In science we try to trace phenomena back to their first causes, and
to general laws and principles. In art we are absorbed in their imme-
diate appearance, and we enjoy this appearance to the fullest extent in
all its richness and variety.... The two views of truth are in contrast
with one another, but not in conflict or contradiction.... The psychol-
ogy of sense perception has taught us that without the use of both eyes,
without a binocular vision, there would be no awareness of the third
dimension of space. The depth of human experience in the same sense
depends on the fact that we are able to vary our modes of seeing, that
we can alternate our views of reality.2
This is the heart of what I have to say in this Tyrrell Williams Lecture.
Legal reality has a twofold aspect. There is a "science" of law in which
every case is, in truth, an illustration of a general rule. There is an "art"
of law in which the focus of perception is on the individual case, in all its
2. CASSnmR, AN EssAY ON MAN 169-70 (Yale ed. 1962).
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immediacy and singularity. "The particular in isolation," Felix Frankfurter
once wrote, "is meaningless; the generalization without concreteness, ster-
ile."3 Without binocular vision, without the use of both eyes, there can be
no true understanding of the problem of justice as it exists in law in life.
Here, I suggest, is the middle ground between a jurisprudence of con-
ceptions, in which legal rules are primary and particular cases seen as gen-
eralization fodder, and an equally unacceptable legal nominalism which
looks only to "fireside equities"4 and dismisses legal rules as mere grounds
for rationalization of decisions reached ad hoc. Conceptualist and nomina-
list theories of the decisional process are equally misdescriptive of the prac-
tice of justice as it goes on from day to day in the real world of courts, law
enforcement agencies, and law offices. Each, the conceptualist and the nom-
inalist, has hold of a part of the truth, but each asserts a profoundly false
either/or relation between the demand of the general legal principle and
the appeal of the concrete situation embodied in a particular controversy.
For it is not either/or in the practice of justice. A legal order like ours is
at once mindful of the values of consistency and predictability in the applica-
tion of principles and sensitive to the variety, the intractable singularity, of
the controversies that arise between men in society.
My emphasis, in the next part of this discussion, will be on the many
ways in which the legal order, as it exists, manifests its sensitivity and re-
sponsiveness to the individual merits of particular cases. Do not infer from
this emphasis that I am subscribing to the full nominalist thesis and for-
getting the "law as rule" side of the binocular vision of justice. If I were
forced, as I am not, to choose between the schools and become either a
card-carrying nominalist or a card-carrying conceptualist, I would, I sup-
pose, say that the nominalists are rather closer to legal reality, at least as it
exists in trial courts and in law offices, than their rule-minded adversaries
are, but that is not the explanation of my emphasis. My point is rather
that the "scientific" view-rules as primary and cases as incidental and sec-
ondary-is vastly over-represented in the literature of jurisprudence and
legal scholarship, and I hope to contribute towards some restoration of the
balance by emphasizing, perhaps over-emphasizing, the aspect of case-mind-
edness and individualization in the practice of justice. A little skeptical
3. FRANxFuRTER, Mr. justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HAv. L. Rnv. 121,
157 (1929).
4. The late Karl N. Llewellyn drew a sharp distinction between "the relevant prob-
lem-situation as a type" and the "fireside equities" or "other possibly unique attributes
of the case in hand." LLEWELLYN, THE Coou.Ox LAW TRADITIoN-DECDINO APPEALS
268 (1960). (Emphasis added.) The term "fireside equities" is used as the equivalent
of "the immediate equities of the controversy." Id. at 443.
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nominalism is good for legal analysis, and long overdue. For, and this will
be one conclusion of this Lecture, the exaltation of general rule over con-
crete case in formal professional discourse, in discussions of law and legal
institutions by scholars in other fields, and in the understanding of citizens
generally, has gravely undesirable consequences for law administration and
law practice, and for law itself.
II. THE WAYS AND MEANS OF INDIVIDUALIZATION
The "scientific" element in the practice of justice is related to the basic
requirement that law's precepts be general in statement and application.
Without generality in law, there would be no equality in the legal order,
no impersonality or formal rationality in the operation of adjudicative in-
stitutions, no predictability in the planning of future conduct. "On the
whole," wrote the late Edwin W. Patterson, "the generality of law is its
most important characteristic."5 Indeed, the idea of the legal precept as a
measure, a norm, a general rule, is so deeply ingrained in our legal philos-
ophy that most definitions of "law" list generality as an essential attribute
and exclude the particular command, order or judgment.
Yet we know that there is another side to law's formal generality. To be
general, a precept must be abstract, and the inclusiveness of any abstract
formulation is achieved only by sacrificing something of concrete reality.
We are mindful of Alfred North Whitehead's warning that "No code of
verbal statement can ever exhaust the shifting background of presupposed
fact,"' and of Justice Holmes' astringent observation that "General proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases."' But the classic statement of this aspect
of the problem of justice is much older and comes, curiously enough, from
Aristotle, a thinker far more inclined in his general world view to universals
than to singulars:
Law is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not
possible to cover in a general statement. In matters therefore, while it
is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly,
the law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is
not unaware of the error this involves. And this does not make it a
5. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE-MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 97 (1953).
6. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 71 (Mentor ed. 1933).
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion). Shortly be-
fore the Lochner decision, Holmes had written the following to his friend, Sir Frederick
Pollock: "My intellectual furniture consists of an assortment of general propositions
which grow fewer and more general as I grow older. I always say that the chief end
of man is to frame them and that no general proposition is worth a damn." 1 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 118 (Howe ed. 1941).
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wrong law; for the error is not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in
the nature of the case: the material of conduct is essentially irregular.
* . . This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification
of law where law is defective because of its generality.8
Aristotle's definition of the "equitable" is a prophetic and wonderfully
apt description of the historic role of the English courts of chancery during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the common law, for a time,
lost its traditional sensitivity to the merits of individual cases and became
rigid and rule-bound. Equity has disappeared since then as a separate sys-
tem of courts, but the idea of the equitable survives in full vitality and in-
vigorates the common law judicial process. Consider, as a manifest example,
the extent to which our law's central working policy, the doctrine of pre-
cedent, reflects this pervasive inclination to concrete and singular cases
rather than to abstract and general rules. To say that a court follows the
principle of stare decisis does not mean that it applies, in a mechanical and
undiscriminating way, the general propositions of law stated in past judicial
opinions. In the use of case-law precedents there is always room for neces-
sary case-to-case individualization, always leeway for Aristotle's "rectifica-
tion of law where law is defective because of its generality."
The common law doctrine of precedent is grossly misunderstood if seen
only as a device for insuring certainty and generality in the application of es-
tablished case-law principles. To be sure, it has that function: as a general
matter, like cases are to be decided alike. But common law method is in-
tractably case-minded, fully as sensitive to factual differences in cases as to
their factual similarities. Rules stated in past judicial opinions are mere
dicta-"persuasive" but not "controlling" as statements of legal principle-
if they go beyond the material facts of the cases that were then before the
court for decision. Yesterday's precedent is "binding" on the court in to-
day's controversy only if the two cases involve the same material facts. And
it is today's court, confronted with today's concrete and singular controversy,
that determines what the material facts of yesterday's case were-and so
whether yesterday's decision is a binding precedent for the disposition of
today's controversy.
It is quite true, as exponents of one or another version of slot-machine
jurisprudence enjoy pointing out, that flat overrulings are few and far be-
tween, except perhaps in the Supreme Court of the United States, where
special considerations and special ground rules apply. A typical state court
8. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 5, reprinted in MoRRIs, THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOS-
OPHERS 25 (1959). The quotation is from the Rackham translation in the Loeb Classical
Library. Compare the same text, in the Ross translation, in MCKEON, INTRODUCTION
TO ARISTOTLE 421 (1947).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss2/1
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE
of last resort-the Supreme Court of Missouri or the Court of Appeals of
New York-will, in the course of a working year, explicitly overrule at most
two or three of its established case-precedents. But to stress this is to miss
the point of the common law tradition. Out-and-out overruling of pre-
cedents is rarely necessary, because, in most situations, a just and sensible
decision for today's case can be reached by distinguishing any embarrassing
precedents away as somehow different in material facts from the concrete
case now before the court. As this selective process continues over the years
-this helpful precedent extended to justify sought results in new situations,
that awkward one limited or distinguished away-we are likely to see the
emergence of competing lines of precedent, so that a conscientious trial
judge, called on to decide a close and difficult controversy, can decide that
new case either way and support his chosen decision with all conventional
legal proprieties.
What I have said about the room for case-by-case individualization within
the policy of stare decisis is not to be taken as a cynical account of the judi-
cial process. To me, as I think to most lawyers, this flexibility and respon-
siveness to the particular merits of particular cases is the essential genius
of the common law system. My present point is the narrower but, I think,
more important one that the workings of our method of precedent exhibit
dramatically the interplay of science and art, general rule and concrete case,
in the practice of justice.
What does this mean for the work of counselors, advocates and judges
in the world of law in action? All the implications could not be exhausted
in a lecture ten times longer than this one, but a few should suffice for our
present purposes. If the counselor is to make an accurate prediction of
"what the courts will do in fact" in a given problem situation, he must be
as sensitive to the factual singularity and intrinsic equity of the concrete
case on which his professional advice is sought as he is knowledgeable about
the general "state of the law" embodied in the precedents. If the advocate
is to make an effective presentation of a case committed to his charge, he
cannot proceed, as too many do, by offering the court a formless and un-
focussed collection of past judicial statements and holdings; what matters
most is not past cases but the case he has now, and the factual merits of that
case must shine through if his argument is ever to engage the serious at-
tention of the court.
9. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law." HOLMES, The Path of the Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PA-
PERS 173 (1920). The Path of the Law, the most influential piece of writing in the
history of American jurisprudence, was originally delivered as an address to law students
at Boston University and first published in 10 H.Av. L. REv. 457 (1897).
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To be sure, the judge presiding over any argument is doing his best to
apply the law; he is bound by his judicial oath to do precisely that. But
he wants, too, to reach a just result in the particular case before him. More
often than not, if the judge gets proper assistance from counsel in a case,
he can accomplish both of his sought objectives. There is no paradox in
this; it is a consequence of our legal system's built-in responsiveness to the
appeal of justice in concrete situations. In the binocular vision of justice,
fidelity to general law and fairness in the disposition of particular cases are
contrasting but not contradictory objectives.
Thus far I have been dealing almost exclusively with the realities of our
common law method of precedent. Stare decisis is, after all, the distinctive
policy of Anglo-American law and the one most often misunderstood by
critics within and without the fraternity of legal scholarship. But I do not
mean to suggest that the process of discriminating individualization is found
uniquely in the use of case precedents as decisional sources. Established
techniques of statutory construction in the federal and state courts reflect
the same inclination to take due account of the particular facts of concrete
cases, and there is as much room for responsible case-by-case individualiza-
tion in the judicial application of statutes as in the decision of controversies
by reference to case-law precedents.
To say this is not to affix a general endorsement to Bishop Hoadley's
famous pronouncement, so often quoted by John Chipman Gray, that
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken
laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not
the person who first wrote or spoke them."10 Whatever the scope of judicial
discretion, the judicial process in the interpretation of statutes is not as free-
wheeling as all that! But there are ways and means, accepted and legiti-
mate ones, of case-to-case "rectification" of statutory generality. If the words
of a statute, read alone, point to what a court deems the fair result in a con-
crete case, the court can invoke the familiar plain meaning rule and refuse
to go beyond the text of the statute. If the same statute, literally applied,
would lead to an unjust result on the facts of the next case, the court is
likely to take another look into its bag of clubs and pull out the equally
respectable principle that statutes are to be applied not literally but in ac-
cordance with the intention of the legislature. If neither of these approaches
accomplishes the sensible result, there is a whole armory of devices to be
drawn on: canons of strict construction, presumptions against retroactive
10. Gray uses the quotation three times in THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
102, 125, 172 (Beacon Press ed. 1963). Gray's views on the interpretation of statutes are
sharply criticized as "atomistic" in FULLER, THE MoRALITY OF LAW 84 (1964).
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application, maxims like ejusdem generis and expressio unius, and many
more.
Orderly minded, scholarly critics are likely to find nothing but rampant
confusion and inconsistency in the decisional literature of statutory con-
struction. They should dig deeper, because much of the inconsistency van-
ishes, or takes on a different appearance, if we borrow a clue from Holmes 1
and address our inquiry not to "What rule of construction was employed
by the court in this case?" but to "Why did the court in this case use this
rule of construction rather than one of the others at hand?" Try this little ex-
ercise on the next ten cases you read that involve questions of statutory con-
struction. I warrant that you will find, in at least nine of them, that the
court chose the rule of construction it did because that was the one that
led to a sensible and just decision in the concrete case at hand. In statutory
cases, too, accurate prediction and effective counseling depend not only
on the lawyer's understanding of what the statute says but also and equally
on his sensitivity to and ability to convey the intrinsic merits of the case he
has now.
Law's responsiveness to the variety and case-to-case singularity of the
controversies that can arise between men in society finds expression not only
in our accepted techniques for the use of legal sources but also, and per-
haps more obviously, in the form of the sources themselves. Outsiders, even
philosophers and social scientists who should know better, tend to think of
the law as a body of quite specific rules, an aggregate of precise and nar-
rowly worded propositions like "don't start until the light turns green,"
"a will is invalid unless witnessed by two persons," or "a bid at an auction
sale is not an offer." There are many cut-and-dried directions like these:
one finds them, for example, in real property, where certainty of record is
a value of top-priority importance; in criminal law, where our tradition re-
quires that explicit warning be given to possible offenders; and in income
taxation, where the administrative efficiency of a mass-production operation
is a dominant consideration. In most areas of the law, however, the crucial
precepts are formulated in terms of far wider connotation. As Cardozo
wrote almost fifty years ago: "We are tending more and more towards an
appreciation of the truth that, after all, there are few rules; there are chiefly
standards and degrees."' "
Thus in the law of contracts-a course I teach as everyone who ever took
11. "You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition
in a contract. But why do you imply it? . . .Such matters really are battlegrounds ...
where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a
given time and place." HOLMES, supra note 9, at 181.
12. CAnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161 (1921).
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Contracts from Tyrrell Williams must long to do-a right to restitution for
a benefit conferred on another person exists "if as between the two persons
it is unjust for the recipient to retain it,"13 and an unbargained-for promise
that has induced action by the promisee is binding on the promisor "if in-
justice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."" There is no
tension here between the demand of general legal policy and the claim of
justice in the concrete case; the legal principle itself incorporates individual
justice as the governing test.
Broad standards like these are not unique to the law of contracts; indeed,
contracts is a "reliance" area of law, and its precepts are probably less wide
in formulation than in many other fields. The law of torts has its standard
of the "reasonably prudent man," the law of trusts its sweeping concept of
"fiduciary obligation," and constitutional law its standard of "due process
of law" and others expressed in terms so broad that Learned Hand char-
acterized them as "empty vessels into which [the judge] can pour nearly
anything he will.""5
The use of broadly formulated standards is not, we must note, a survival
from more primitive stages of law's development but a phenomenon of law's
maturity. As law becomes more sophisticated about the efficacy of detailed
rules and more sensitive to the varieties of human controversy, less faith is
put in narrow commands as instruments of justice and more faith in case-
by-case discretion and judicial judgment. Roscoe Pound recorded this pre-
vailing movement in legislative and judicial lawmaking in words that would
be hard to improve on:
[Standards] are general limits of permissible conduct to be applied
according to the circumstances of each case. They are the chief reliance
of modem law for individualization of application and are coming to
be applied to conduct and conduct of enterprises over a very wide
domain .... It may be said that in each case there is a rule (in the
narrower sense) prescribing adherence to the standard and imposing
consequences if the standard is not lived up to. This is true. But no
definite, detailed state of facts is provided for. No definite pattern is laid
down. No threat is attached to any defined situation. The significant
thing is the standard, to be applied, not absolutely as in case of a rule,
but in view of the facts of each case.1"
13. RESTATEMFENT, RESTITUTION § 1 and comment c (1937), summarized in JoNns,
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 195 (1965).
14. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
15. Sources of Tolerance, address by Learned Hand, June 1930, in THE SPRIT oF
LIBERTY 81 (Dilliard ed. 1952).
16. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL.
L. REv. 475, 485 (1933).
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Statutes and case-law principles expressed in standards like these do more
than authorize case-by-case judgment in the decisional process. They in-
vite and command it, and, for the counselor, the advocate and the judge,
everything turns again on the singular factual merits of the concrete case
at hand.
Institutions for case-by-case individualization in the handling of concrete
human controversies are encountered everywhere in the practice of justice.
If we were not as preoccupied as we are with the idea of law as a body of
rules, explicit commands, we would see these institutions for what they are
and so be able to appraise them in terms of their actual, not their formal,
function. The jury system, seen in this perspective, is far less a device for
the finding of facts than an agency-perhaps, to be sure, an outmoded one
-for individualization in the application of law. When a jury brings in a
verdict that seems against the weight of the evidence, it is an incomplete
explanation to say that it has made an erroneous finding of the facts. The
jurymen may have known perfectly well what the out-of-court facts were
but made their decision, against their instructions and in the teeth of the
facts, because of their shared conviction that the essential justice of the case
was with one party rather than the other.
Decisions like these, turning on the decision-maker's impression as to the
essential justice of a matter, are made every day in the enforcement of the
criminal law, and it is in prosecutors' offices, rather than in courts, that
most of these decisions are arrived at. Shall an accused person be charged,
and, if so, with how grave a crime? Shall he be given the opportunity to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, or shall he be prosecuted for the most serious
crime that the evidence will support? Twenty-five years ago, I had respon-
sibility for the direction of a massive law enforcement program," and I have
believed ever since that the discretion of the prosecutor is the most impor-
tant single element in a state's criminal law. The Model Penal Code pre-
pared under the leadership of my colleague, Herbert Wechsler, is a towering
achievement in legal scholarship and law reform, but I rejoice equally in
the growing increase of our knowledge, to which Professor Miller and Pro-
fessor Gerard of this law faculty have made substantial contributions, con-
cerning the ways in which police officials and prosecuting officers exercise
their discretion and inevitable dispensing power in the individualization of
criminal prosecution and punishment. 8
17. Director of Food Enforcement, Office of Price Administration.
18. LAFAVE, ARREsT-THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965) is
the first of a series of monographs on the administration of criminal justice in the United
States being brought out by the American Bar Foundation under the general editorship
of Professor Frank J. Remington. The volume on prosecution for this important series
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On an occasion like this one, I could not possibly undertake a complete
and encyclopedic inventory of the agencies of individualization that abound
in our legal order. It must be noted, however, that the task of case-by-
case individualization is performed not only by judges and other public
ministers of the law but also by practicing lawyers. The lawyer's distinctive
art, adaptation of law's general rules to the merits and necessities of con-
crete situations, is called for at every stage of the profession's work: in the
drafting of wills, agreements, and other documents, in the structuring of
transactions, in the arbitration of disputes, and in the negotiation and ar-
rangement of out-of-court settlements.
Anyone with a little legal training can consult the law books and tell a
client what he cannot do. The lawyer-the honest-to-God lawyer-has the
imagination and intellectual resourcefulness necessary to tell his client how
he can do, legally and fairly, the things that a concrete situation requires
be done. This necessitates not only knowledge of the state of the law but
also-and this is far harder-deep and perceptive understanding of what
I have been calling "the case you have now." In the lawyer's office, as in
the courtroom, there is need for a binocular vision that is, at once, mindful
of the demands of the general rule and sensitive to the merits and necessities
of the concrete situation.
III. LEGAL REALITY: THE NEED FOR CANDOR
"A case, not an exercise in algebra!" Why have I made this the essential
theme of today's lecture? One reason, and a sufficient one, is that it is some-
thing I learned from my great teacher, Tyrrell Williams. The other and
closely related reason is that I consider it the most important single thing
that can be said to law students, or to scholars in any field who want to
have a grasp of legal reality.
We are always hearing about a supposed "gap between law school and
law practice." This, I suggest, is not a matter of knowing where the clerk's
office is or how to prepare an affidavit. Law graduates are brighter than
they were in my day, and they catch on to workaday details with astonish-
ing ease and speed. The true gap is that students-and here they are like
scholars in any field-leave law school almost too well informed about
general legal principles and insufficiently aware of law's pervasive occasions
for case-by-case individualization. A few years practice of the lawyer's art
corrects this imbalance in most instances, but it is a gap that many lawyers
never manage to get across, to the lasting damage of their professional ca-
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reers and the profound disservice of their unhappy clients.
In university legal education, it is the case method of instruction on which
we rely to give our students an awareness of the continuing interplay of
legal science and the lawyer's art. 9 The founder of the case method, Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell, built better than he knew. We have abandoned
Dean Langdell's notion of the case method as a "scientific" procedure, but
we have retained it as the way to develop the qualities of what we like to
call the "legal mind": precision in the understanding and statement of facts,
distrust of easy generalizations, and capacity for original and constructive
thought.
There is need for a continuing rear-guard action to maintain the integrity
of the law school case method. We law teachers are too much inclined to-
ward the use of cases not as exercises in the practice of the lawyer's art but
as mere illustrations of general rules and principles. With the vast extension
of government regulation and the proliferation of legal materials, we are
under increasing pressures to cover more ground, offer more courses, give
law students more and more legal information. Like our brothers of the
judiciary and the practicing bar, we academic lawyers are unduly preoc-
cupied with the appellate courts-where the distinctive task is that of clari-
fying the general law-and give insufficient attention to the trial courts,
where the task of fair individual decision is central. At the risk of sounding
like the Ancient Mariner, I would have us stand by the case method. It
is a painfully slow way of covering substantive ground, but it is the best
device I know for communicating the realities of the binocular vision of
justice.
When one moves outside the universe of the law schools and the legal
profession, he becomes conscious of other damage done by the undue con-
centration of our professional discourse on law as general rule. Social
scientists are becoming more interested in legal institutions and far more
willing than they used to be to work in collaboration with lawyers for better
understanding and practical improvement of the legal order. But, by and
large, the scholarly and pragmatic value of the work done so far in law-re-
lated fields by sociologists, economists, social psychologists, political scientists
and others has been gravely reduced by their failure to apprehend the pri-
macy of the case in the practice of justice. It is painful to see how a social
scientist, wonderfully sophisticated in his own field, can adopt a slot machine
theory of justice and remain oblivious to the occasions for case-to-case dis-
cretion that characterize present-day American law.
19. See Jones, Objectives and Insights in University Legal Education, 11 OHIo ST. L.
J. 4, 5-7 (1950), Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins
and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1951).
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But there are even more serious consequences. Widespread public mis-
apprehensions concerning the realities of law in action have contributed al-
most everywhere to a serious underrating of the importance of judicial per-
sonnel and judicial selection.2" The Missouri Plan of merit selection of
judges is, I am confident, the wave of the future, but it is not state-wide
even in Missouri, and it is a long way off in most jurisdictions. We will not
have a sound system of judicial selection throughout the United States until
informed citizens generally are made conscious of the interplay of law as
science and law as art in the administration of justice.
Too many people, unaware that law has its aspect of discriminating in-
dividualization as well as its aspect of generality, conclude that it makes
little difference who occupies the bench. Assuming elementary probity, they
ask, will not any two judges decide a case the same way? Other laymen,
a bit better informed, but not much, make the frightful assumption that a
lawyer is best qualified to be a judge if he is a walking encyclopedia of legal
rules and principles. I hardly need to add that everything I have just said
applies equally to the selection of district attorneys and other prosecuting
officials. If, as I believe, the most important thing about a jurisdiction's
criminal law is who its district attorney is, it is urgent that citizens generally
be made aware of the fact that prosecuting attorneys, informally, and largely
on their impressions of offenses and offenders, decide the fate of far more
accused persons than ever appear in the courts for trial.
But I would not rest my case entirely on pragmatic considerations. The
rule of law is central to our society, and it should be known, discussed and
venerated for what it is. Public awareness of the binocular vision of justice
will not, as the conceptualists fear, reduce respect for legal institutions. For
there is surely nothing discreditable about a legal order that pursues, at
once, the goal of equality before the law and the contrasting but not, in our
system, contradictory goal of justice in the individual case.
20. Winters & Allard, Judicial Selection and Tenure in the United States in THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAw EXPLOSION 147 (Jones ed. 1965).
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